Managerial Overconfidence And Going-Concern Modified Audit Opinion Decisions by Ji, Gayoung & Lee, Jong Eun
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2015 Volume 31, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 2123 The Clute Institute 
Managerial Overconfidence And Going -
Concern Modified Audit Opinion Decisions 
Gayoung Ji, Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea 
Jong Eun Lee, Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We examine how auditors perceive managerial overconfidence during audit reporting by testing 
the relationship between managerial overconfidence and the likelihood of issuing a first-time 
going-concern modified audit opinion to financially distressed firms. After controlling for the 
factors affecting auditor’s going-concern modified audit opinion decision, we find that the 
likelihood of issuing a first-time going-concern modified audit opinion is positively associated 
with managerial overconfidence, suggesting that auditors adversely value overconfident 
management in financially distressed firms and thus tend to issue a first-time going-concern 
modified audit opinion to them. We also find that the positive association above is reinforced with 
capital market uncertainty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his study investigates the impact of managerial overconfidence on auditors’ going-concern modified 
audit opinion (GCO) decisions for financially distressed firms.1  
 
Recent studies on managerial overconfidence in finance and accounting document the association between 
managerial overconfidence and a variety of corporate policies, such as corporate investment, mergers and 
acquisitions, financing, dividend policies, earnings management, management forecasting, tax avoidance, financial 
misreporting, and accounting conservatism (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Cordeiro, 2009; Deshmukh et 
al., 2013; Malmendier et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2005; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bamber et 
al., 2010; Frank and Goyal, 2007; Dyreng et al., 2010; Hribar and Yang, 2011; Schrand and Zechman, 2011; Ahmed 
and Duellman, 2013). However, little attention has been paid to how managerial overconfidence is perceived by 
stakeholders. This study examines how auditors perceive managers’ cognitive bias towards overconfidence when 
making first-time going-concern modified audit opinion (FGCO) decisions for financially distressed firms. 
 
Audit reports with GCO in the explanatory paragraph have been examined by audit firms and shareholders 
because of their negative effects, such as bankruptcy.2 3 For example, if an auditor does not issue a GCO to the 
previous financial statements of a bankrupt firm (called a “type II error”), the auditor is more likely to be sued by 
shareholders (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994). This litigation can damage an auditor’s reputation, and subsequent 
auditor switches by clients can hurt the auditor financially (Carcello and Palmrose, 1994). If an auditor issues a 
GCO to a firm’s financial statement incorrectly and the firm survives (called a “type I error”), the auditor’s 
                                                
1 In this study, “managerial overconfidence” and “CEO overconfidence” are used interchangeably. 
2 According to the Statement on Auditing Standards, auditors’ ultimate responsibility is to express an audit opinion on their client’s financial 
statements. The auditor can issue various types of audit reports, such as a standard audit report with unqualified opinion (”clean opinion”), an 
audit report with unqualified opinion but an explanatory paragraph, and audit reports with qualified opinion, adverse opinion, or a disclaimer of 
opinion on financial statements. 
3 A going-concern modified audit opinion is an unqualified opinion, meaning that the financial statements are fairly presented in accordance with 
financial accounting standards. However, the auditors insert an explanatory paragraph in order to explain that they are suspicious of their client’s 
ability to continue as a going concern due to current and/or potential financial problems. 
T 
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reputation will be greatly damaged.4 Therefore, although the GCO is an unqualified audit opinion, it is critical to 
both auditors and their clients. 
 
According to AU-C Section 570 (SAS No. 126), the auditor is responsible for evaluating “whether there is 
substantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern” within 12 months after a fiscal year end. 
The evaluation should be based on the “auditor’s knowledge of relevant conditions or events that exist at, or have 
occurred prior to, the date of the auditor’s report.” An auditor who identifies events and/or conditions that cause 
substantial doubt about the entity’s going concern assumption must collect supporting and/or mitigating evidence 
related to that doubt and evaluate its impact on the going concern assumption. In this study, we argue that CEO 
overconfidence should be evaluated as one of the determinants affecting auditors’ GCO decisions because CEOs are 
central to the plans firms implement to escape from financial distress. Overconfident CEOs can be positively valued 
if auditors agree on the overconfident CEOs’ optimistic view of the future performance of current investments and 
believe that the overconfident CEOs are capable of executing a management plan for reviving from financial 
distress. The recent psychology study in Anderson et al. (2012) suggests that overconfident managers can attain high 
social status because they can be erroneously viewed as more competent than they really are. However, other studies 
(e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Ben-David et al., 2010) reveal the negative aspects of overconfident CEOs, 
such as unnecessary mergers and acquisitions and excessive investment, including investments with negative net 
present value. Therefore, auditors can negatively value overconfident CEOs because they are less likely to take 
appropriate action rationally for their firm’s future survival. Consequently, auditors who put more weight on the 
negative (positive) aspects of overconfident CEOs are more (less) likely to issue GCOs to financially distressed 
firms. If one aspect does not dominate the other, managerial overconfidence will not influence the auditors’ GCO 
decision. How auditors perceive the overconfident CEOs of firms with going-concern uncertainty when making a 
GCO decision is thus an important and interesting open empirical question. 
 
Following Schrand and Zechman (2011), we measure firm-specific time-variant managerial overconfidence 
and investigate its impact on auditors’ GCO decisions using a sample composed of financially distressed firms that 
received FGCOs from 2001 to 2011. After controlling for the factors affecting auditors’ GCO decisions, we find that 
the propensity to issue a FGCO is positively associated with CEO overconfidence, suggesting that auditors are more 
likely to issue FGCOs by adversely valuing the overconfident CEOs of financially distressed firms. Further analysis 
reveals that the positive association between managerial overconfidence and the likelihood of issuing a FGCO is 
more pronounced when capital market uncertainty is high, such as during the pre-SOX and global financial crisis 
periods. 
 
Our study contributes to two important research streams on auditor reporting decisions and managerial 
overconfidence. First, we provide evidence that CEO overconfidence, a managerial cognitive bias, is an additional 
determinant affecting auditors’ GCO decisions on financially distressed firms. Specifically, we find that auditors 
adversely value the overconfident CEOs of firms in financial distress and are more likely to issue FGCOs to such 
firms. Second, recent accounting studies of managerial overconfidence document the association between 
managerial overconfidence and a variety of corporate policies, such as financial misreporting and accounting 
conservatism; our study extends the extant literature by focusing on perceptions of managerial overconfidence. We 
provide evidence that auditors’ perceptions of CEO overconfidence lead them to determine that overconfident CEOs 
are too risky to stabilize their firms’ financial distress. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The literature is reviewed and the hypotheses are developed 
in section 2. In section 3, we present the study’s research design and empirical model. The sample and data are 
described in section 4. In section 5, the empirical results are presented. Finally, the last section provides a summary 
and conclusion. 
 
  
                                                
4 In a self-fulfilling prophecy, issuing a going-concern modified audit opinion to a firm in financial difficulty can accelerate its bankruptcy. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Literature Review 
 
CEO Overconfidence 
 
In the economics literature, humans are assumed to behave rationally and make an optimal decision, while 
psychological research shows that humans are not perfectly rational and have cognitive biases. Overconfidence, a 
cognitive bias, has been examined in the recent finance and accounting literature (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 
2008; Malmendier et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Hribar and Yang, 2011; Schrand and Zechman, 2011; 
Ahmed and Duellman, 2013). Overconfidence is described as a behavioral or psychological bias leading to an 
overestimation of the future uncertain outcomes of current events. This overconfidence is mainly formed by the 
“better-than-average effect” (Svenson, 1981), the tendency of humans to think of themselves as above average. The 
overestimation of future outcomes by overconfident CEOs may lead to excessive optimism, which could adversely 
influence firms’ corporate policies or financial reporting decisions. 
 
Accordingly, Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that overconfident CEOs produce a higher sensitivity 
between investments and free cash flows, implying overinvestment and lower investment efficiency. In terms of 
mergers and acquisitions, Billett and Qian (2008) use a dynamic measure of overconfidence to show that managerial 
overconfidence is positively correlated with more acquisition decision making. Malmendier and Tate (2008) show 
that overconfident CEOs are more likely to execute value-destroying mergers and acquisitions and overpay for 
acquired firms. In addition, Deshmuk et al. (2013) report that overconfident CEOs prefer lower dividend payouts. 
Campbell et al. (2009) argue that CEO overconfidence is positively correlated with involuntary turnover. Contrary 
to these findings on the negative consequence of CEO overconfidence on corporate policy, Galasso and Simcoe 
(2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) suggest that overconfident CEOs make more investments in innovation and 
achieve greater innovative success by efficiently utilizing research and development expenditures.  
 
The recent accounting literature has studied the impact of CEO overconfidence on financial reporting 
behavior. For instance, examining 49 firms subject to the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Schrand and Zechman (2011) investigate the association 
between managerial over-optimism and earnings management. They propose two explanations for the earnings 
management of overconfident managers. One is that such mangers intentionally misstate financial reporting for their 
own personal interests. The other is that overoptimistic managers are inclined to issue more optimistic earnings 
forecasts and be involved in intentional misstatement in order to beat or meet earnings forecasts. Consistent with 
their argument, Schrand and Zechman (2011) find that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting to beat or meet their overoptimistic earnings expectations. Furthermore, Ahmed and 
Duellman (2012) show that overconfident CEOs are more likely to delay loss recognition, indicating less loss 
recognition conservatism. Presley and Abbott (2013) report that overconfident CEOs are more likely to restate 
previously issued financial statements. Overall, studies confirm that CEO overconfidence adversely affects firms’ 
financial reporting behavior, reducing financial reporting quality and generating more earnings management, less 
use of conservative accounting, and more frequent restatements of previously reported financial statements. 
 
Going-Concern Modified Audit Opinion 
 
Under SAS No. 126 (AICPA 2012), auditors must “evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the 
entity’s ability to continue as a going concern” during a period of time not exceeding 12 months from the balance 
sheet date. Auditor evaluations of going-concern uncertainty are made based on knowledge of the relevant events 
and conditions existing at or prior to the date of the field completion (i.e., the date of the auditor’s report). While 
verifying the assertions embodied in the entity’s financial statements, auditors can detect indications of an entity’s 
going-concern uncertainty, including financial difficulties (e.g., recurring operating losses, negative operating cash 
flows) and internal or external matters (e.g., work stoppages, litigation, bankruptcy of a principal customer or 
supplier). The auditors will then evaluate the degree of going-concern uncertainty and consider issuing GCOs to the 
firms. 
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The prior literature on GCOs, focusing on financial statement information, identifies a variety of client 
characteristics related to GCO decision making. For instance, the issuance of GCOs is negatively associated with 
profitability (e.g., Kida, 1980; Mutchler, 1985; Dopuch et al., 1987; Altman and McGough, 1974; Menon and 
Schwartz, 1987), liquidity (e.g., Koh and Killough, 1990; Koh, 1991; Lennox, 1999; Raghunandan and Rama, 
1995), and firm size (e.g., McKeown et al., 1991; Mutchler et al., 1997; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001) while 
positively associated with leverage (e.g., Altman and McGough, 1974; Kida, 1980; Mutchler, 1985; Dopuch et al., 
1987; Raghunandan and Rama, 1995). In addition to financial statement variables, studies (e.g., Dopuch et al., 1987; 
Mutchler and Williams, 1990; DeFond et al., 2002) provide evidence that market variables such as return and its 
volatility as non-financial information are associated with GCO issuance. Most research finds that auditors are more 
likely to issue GCOs to firms with lower industry-adjusted return or higher return volatility. In terms of auditor 
independence, auditors are less likely to issue GCOs to firms with significant economic dependence (Geiger and 
Rama, 2003; Blay and Geiger), whereas Reynolds and Francis (2000) and DeFond et al. (2002) find no association 
between economic dependence and propensity to issue GCOs. In addition, a recent study of Fargher et al. (2014) 
provides evidence that auditors are more likely to issue GCOs to financially distressed firms that have executive 
compensation structure with risk-taking incentives, suggesting that auditors adversely value CEOs with risk-taking 
motivation. 
 
Auditors are also supposed to find GCO-mitigating factors (e.g., management’s future financing plan) and 
evaluate their potential impacts on current going-concern uncertainty. Specifically, SAS No. 126 (AICPA 2012) 
requires auditors to evaluate management’s plan to escape from current financial distress. Behn et al. (2001) find 
that management plans to raise capital from equity issuance or borrowings are negatively associated with GCO 
issuance. 
 
Taken together, studies suggest that auditors seek to identify events or conditions affecting clients’ going-
concern uncertainty, primarily based on financial statement information. When auditors detect a going-concern 
factor, they must identify and evaluate management’s plans to mitigate the issuance of a GCO. Consequently, 
auditors’ GCO decisions are made after considering both the going-concern status and the mitigating factors 
affecting the potential issuance of a GCO.   
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
According to SAS No. 126 (AICPA 2012), if, after identifying conditions or events that violate an entity’s 
going-concern assumption, the auditor detects a going-concern uncertainty, the auditor must obtain and evaluate 
management’s plans (e.g., to sell assets or raise capital through issuing equity or borrowing) to mitigate the going-
concern uncertainty. The auditor has to assess the significance of management’s plans to overcome the going-
concern uncertainty or the feasibility of future financing plans. More importantly, the auditor must assess if 
management is willing and able to implement its plans. Furthermore, when prospective financial information is 
critical to the success of the management plans, the auditor must thoroughly review its validity and reliability. This 
assessment should be based on knowledge of the firm, its business, and its management. 
 
When assessing management along with the relevant financial information, the auditor should apply a 
professional skepticism. The financial information provided by overconfident CEOs may be unrealistically 
optimistic because, as mentioned, they are overoptimistic about future returns on current investments. While it is 
absolutely the auditor’s responsibility if accepting plans by overconfident CEOs after considering all the relevant 
information, we expect that auditors can respond to CEOs’ overconfidence in one of three ways: 1) positively, 2) 
negatively, or 3) neutrally. 
 
There are positives to CEO overconfidence in terms of corporate policy and management ability. For 
example, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Galasso and Simcoe (2011) show that overconfident CEOs invest more in 
innovation and are more likely to achieve innovative success. Anderson et al. (2012) suggest that overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to have a higher social status, enhancing their social network and making them look more 
competent and capable than they are. Therefore, overconfident CEOs can be positively perceived by auditors 
making GCO decisions. However, there are also negatives to CEO overconfidence in terms of corporate policy and 
financial reporting behavior. Studies reveal the adverse consequence of CEO overconfidence, such as inefficient 
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investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), value-destroying mergers and acquisition (Malmendier and 
Tate, 2008), increased likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting (Schrand and Zechman, 2011), less use of 
conservative accounting (Ahmed and Duellman, 2012), and more frequent restatements of previously reported 
financial statements (Presley and Abbott, 2013). 
 
Consequently, if an auditor believes that, in assessing a firm’s going-concern uncertainty, the positives 
(negatives) of the firm’s CEO overconfidence outweigh its negatives (positives), the CEO overconfidence will be a 
significant mitigating (contrary) factor for the auditor’s substantial doubt about the firm’s ability to continue as a 
going concern. In addition, if an auditor perceives that the positives (negatives) of the firm’s CEO overconfidence 
do not significantly dominate its negatives (positives), the CEO overconfidence will be insignificant to the auditors’ 
GCO decision making. 
 
Therefore, we hypothesize as follows (at the form of null): 
 
Hypothesis: There is no association between managerial overconfidence and the likelihood of issuing first-time 
going-concern audit opinions to financially distressed firms.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
We test the above hypothesis using the logit model below: 
 
P(FGCOit = 1) = F(β0+β1*Managerial OCit+β2*Sizeit+β3*LEVit+β4*OCFit 
+β5*Prob(Bankz)it+β6*Lag Lossit+β7*Investmentsit+β8*Discon OPit 
+β9*Future Financingit+1+β10*Big4it+β11*Log(Age)it+β12*Returnit 
+β13*Betait+β14*Volatilityit+β15*Log(Audit Fees)it) 
where: 
 
FGCO = coded 1 if a firm received a going-concern modified audit opinion on the current fiscal year’s 
financial statements but an unqualified audit opinion on the previous fiscal year’s financial 
statements. 
Managerial OC  = coded 1 if the sum of the following five dummy variables is equal to or greater than 3: 1) 
Excess investment is equal to 1 if excess investment is in the top quartile of firms within the 
industry for the year, where excess investment is measured as the residual from a regression of 
total asset growth on sales growth, and 0 otherwise; 2) Net Acquisition is equal to 1 if the net 
acquisitions from the statement of cash flows are in the top quartile of firms within the industry 
for the year, and 0 otherwise; 3) Debt-to-Equity ratio is equal to 1 if the debt-to-equity ratio is 
in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, where the debt-to-equity is 
measured as long-term debt plus short-term debt, deflated by the total market value of the firm 
measured as the sum of the market value of equity plus the book values of long-term debt and 
preferred stock and 0 otherwise; 4) Risk Debt is equal to 1 if either convertible debt or 
preferred stock is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise; 5) Dividend Yield is equal to 1 if the 
dividend yield is zero and 0 otherwise. 
Size = natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
LEV = debt-to-equity ratio, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of the 
fiscal year. 
OCF = operating cash flows, measured as the cash flows from operating activities deflated by total 
assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
Prob(Bankz) = probability of bankruptcy score (Zmijewski, 1984), measured as -4.803-3.599* (net 
income/total assets)+5.406*(total liabilities/total assets)-0.100*(current assets/current 
liabilities). 
Lag Loss = coded 1 if the firm reports net loss for the previous fiscal year and 0 otherwise. 
Investments = the sum of cash and cash equivalents and short- or long-term investments deflated by total 
assets. 
Discon OP = coded 1 if the firms report discontinued operation and 0 otherwise. 
Future Financing = coded 1 if the firm issues equity or borrows in the subsequent fiscal year and 0 otherwise. 
Big4 = coded 1 if the firm’s auditor is PWC, EY, Deloitte, or KPMG and 0 otherwise. 
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Log(Age) = natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was listed on a stock exchange. 
Return = the firm’s buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year. 
Beta = the firm’s systematic risk, estimated using a market model, over the fiscal year. 
Volatility = the standard deviation of the residual from the market model over the fiscal year. 
Log(Audit Fees) = natural logarithm of audit fees over the fiscal year (in thousands). 
 
P represents the probability of auditors issuing FGCOs to financially distressed firms and F denotes the 
normal cumulative distribution function. Following Dodd et al. (1984) and Loudder et al. (1992), we define FGCO 
as a firm’s receipt of a going-concern audit opinion on the current fiscal year’s financial statements but an 
unqualified audit opinion on the previous fiscal year’s financial statements. We build Managerial OC, a proxy for 
managerial overconfidence, following Schrand and Zechman (2011). Also following Schrand and Zechman (2011), 
we measure Managerial OC at the firm level, coded 1 if the sum of the five dummy variables below is equal to or 
greater than three5: 
 
Excess Investment = dummy variable equal to 1 if excess investment is in the top quartile of firms within the industry 
for the year, where excess investment is measured as the residual from a regression of total asset 
growth on sales growth and 0 otherwise. 
Net Acquisition = dummy variable equal to 1 if net acquisitions from the statement of cash flows are in the top 
quartile of firms within the industry for the year and 0 otherwise. 
Debt-to-Equity 
ratio 
= dummy variable equal to 1 if the debt-to-equity ratio is in the top quartile of firms within the 
industry for the year, where the debt-to-equity ratio is measured as long-term debt plus short-
term debt divided by total market value (=the market value of equity + the book values of long-
term debt + preferred stock) and 0 otherwise. 
Risky Debt = dummy variable equal to 1 if either convertible debt or preferred stock is greater than zero and 0 
otherwise. 
Dividend Yield = dummy variable equal to 1 if dividend yield is zero and 0 otherwise. 
 
Each of these criteria is based on the empirical findings of prior studies on the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on corporate policies such as investing and financing activities and dividend policies. For instance, 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to make excessive investments (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Ben-
David et al., 2010) and value-destroying acquisitions (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2008) and prefer debt to equity 
(e.g., Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 2008) and risky debt with longer terms (e.g., Malmendier et al., 2011; Ben-David et 
al., 2007) while being less likely to pay dividends (e.g., Ben-David et al., 2007). The first three criteria are measured 
by using a three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code in a given year, each set equal to 1 if the value is 
in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year and 0 otherwise. 
 
Following the prior research, we control for a broad variety of client characteristics and mitigating factors 
affecting auditors’ FGCO issuance. First, research shows that the likelihood of issuing GCOs is strongly associated 
with financial statement information, providing evidence that auditors are more likely to issue GCOs to firms of 
smaller size, higher leverage, lower liquidity, higher bankruptcy probability, and less profitability. Thus, we control 
for firm size (Size), debt-to-equity ratio (LEV), cash flows from operating activities (OCF), profitability (Lag Loss), 
and financial stability (Prob(Bankz)). We also consider the factors mitigating auditors’ GCO decisions. DeFond et 
al. (2002) suggest that firms with more resources such as cash and investments are more likely to escape from 
financial difficulty. Behn et al. (2001) document that future financing plans or discontinued operations may help 
rescue financially distressed firms, thus mitigating auditors’ GCO issuance. Thus, Investments, Discon OP, and 
Future Financing are included in the regression model as mitigating factors. Moreover, the Big Four auditors are 
more likely to issue GCO (Mutchler et al., 1997) and auditors are more likely to issue GCOs to younger firms 
(Dopuch et al., 1987; DeFond et al., 2002). Thus, Big4 and Log(Age) are included. In addition to financial statement 
information, market information (i.e., non-financial statement information) is also correlated with the likelihood of 
                                                
5 Another prevalent proxy for CEO overconfidence is an option-based measure, which is based on CEO’s option holding behavior (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005, 2008). The relevant data for the option-based measure are obtained from Execucom database, which is composed of relatively 
large companies. However, the firms that received a going concern modified audit opinion are smaller with financial distress. Therefore, when 
using an option-based measure as a proxy for CEO overconfidence, we cannot obtain test sample firms (i.e., GCO firms) enough to test the 
hypothesis in our study. As a matter of fact, we tried the option-based measure based on Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), we could have only 
a few GCO firms. This measurement issue on CEO overconfidence could be a limitation of our study. 
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GCO issuance (DeFond et al., 2002). We thus include three market-based measures: stock return, systematic risk, 
and stock return volatility. Return and Beta (Volatility) are expected to be negatively (positively) correlated with 
auditors’ GCO decisions. I also include Log(Audit Fees) to control for auditor independence and client importance. 
 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
The main sample in this study consists of firms that received GCOs or unqualified audit opinions between 
2001 and 2011. As mentioned previously, the FGCO firms are defined as those that received GCOs for the current 
fiscal year’s financial statements but unqualified audit opinions for the previous fiscal year’s financial statements. 
CLEAN-opinion (non-GCO) firms are defined as those that received unqualified audit opinions for the financial 
statements of both the current and previous fiscal years. 
 
We collected financial data from the Compustat Industrial Annual files, stock and market returns data from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CSRP) database, and audit opinion, auditor, and audit fee data from the 
Audit Analytics database. To identify FGCO firms, we start with a sample of 182,437 audit opinions drawn from the 
Audit Analytics database covering 2001 to 2011. Then, to identify firms that received qualified audit opinion or 
disclaimer of opinion on the current or previous financial statements, we merge the audit opinion sample above with 
the audit opinion sample from the COMPUSTAT database. We delete 90,191 firm-year observations with qualified 
audit opinions, disclaimers of opinions, or missing audit opinions on the current or previous financial statements. 
We also exclude 75,486 firm-year observations with missing managerial overconfidence, financial, market, auditor, 
or audit fee variables or on the utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) or financial (SIC code 6000-6999) industry because 
they concern regulatory industries with different operating environments. This process produces 16,760 firm-year 
observations. As in prior GCO issuance studies, we restrict the final sample to financially distressed firms, defined 
as firms with both a net loss and negative cash flows from operating activities. We thus identified 3,048 firm-year 
observations. We then excluded 306 financially distressed firm-year observations with GCOs on the firms’ previous 
financial statements, generating 2,742 firm-year observations as a final sample, consisting of 192 FGCO firms and 
2,550 CLEAN opinion firms. The sample selection procedure is described in detail in Table 1, Panel A. 
 
Table 1, Panel B shows the industry distribution of the sample firms; 63 (32.8%) of 819 sample firms in the 
drug and medical equipment industry received FGCOs on their current financial statements (the highest number), 
followed by computers (19.3%), miscellaneous equipment (8.9%), and service (8.3%). Table 1 Panel C presents the 
yearly distribution of the full sample by audit opinion type (FGCO vs. CLEAN opinion). Table 1 Panel C shows 
that, post-SOX, fewer firms received FGCOs (30 in 2001 and 2002, down from 10 in 2003). Consistent with Xu et 
al. (2011, 2013), however, in 2005, FGCO firms increased to 16 and 18 in 2006. In 2008, during an economic 
recession, FGCO firms increased to 30. Up to 2011, finally, during the global economic recovery, FGCO firms 
decreased every year.6 
 
Table Sample 
 
Table 1. Sample 
Panel A. Sample Selection Procedure 
Description Sample 
Firms with an audit opinion on the financial statements between 01/01/2001 and 12/31/2011, from Audit 
Analytics 
182,437 
Firms with qualified audit opinion or disclaimer of opinion; Firms with missing lagged audit opinion, managerial 
overconfidence, financial, market, auditor, or audit fee variables; Firms in financial (SIC code 6000-6999) or 
utilities industry (SIC code 4900-4999)   
(165,677) 
Sub-Total 16,760 
Firms with financial distress (Net income < 0 and Cash flows from operating activities < 0) 3,048 
Firms with going-concern audit opinions on the previous financial statements (306) 
Final sample: 2,742 
FGCO firms a 192 
CLEAN opinion firms b 2,550 
                                                
6 Carey et al. (2012) document that while more GCOs have been issued by auditors since 2001, the GCOs’ accuracy was not significantly 
changed, compared to pre-2001 period. 
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(Table 1 continued) 
Panel B. Industry Distribution of Sample 
Industry (SIC Codes) Full Sample FGCO CLEAN opinion N % N % N % 
Agriculture (100-999) 2 0.1 - 0 2 0.1 
Mining and Construction (1000-1299, 1400-1999) 39 1.4 3 1.6 36 1.4 
Food (2000-2199) 26 1.0 2 1.0 24 0.9 
Textiles, Printing & Publishing (2200-2799) 56 2.0 2 1.0 54 2.1 
Drugs & Medical Equipment (2830-2839) 819 29.8 63 32.8 756 29.7 
Chemicals (2800-2829, 2840-2899) 52 1.9 3 1.6 49 1.9 
Refining and Extractive (1300-1399, 2900-2999)  63 2.3 10 5.2 53 2.1 
Rubber, Leather, and Metal (3000-3499) 43 1.6 4 2.1 39 1.5 
Industrial Equipment (3500-3569, 3580-3659) 159 5.8 5 2.6 154 6.0 
Electrical Equipment (3660-3669, 3680-3699) 154 5.6 10 5.2 144 5.7 
Miscellaneous Equipment (3700-3839, 3852-3999) 217 7.9 17 8.9 200 7.8 
Computers (3570-3579, 3670-3679, 7370-7379) 700 25.5 37 19.3 663 26.0 
Transportation (4000-4899) 96 3.5 8 4.2 88 3.5 
Retail (5000-5999) 116 4.2 6 3.1 110 4.3 
Services (7000-7369, 7380-8999) 182 6.6 16 8.3 166 6.5 
Miscellaneous (9000-9999) 18 0.7 6 3.1 12 0.5 
Total 2,742 100.0 192 100.0 2,550 100.0 
 
Panel C. Yearly Distribution of Sample 
 FGCO a CLEAN opinion b Total N (%) N (%) 
2001 30 (7) 371 (93) 401 
2002 30 (8) 329 (92) 359 
2003 10 (3) 290 (97) 300 
2004 13 (5) 252 (95) 265 
2005 16 (6) 238 (94) 254 
2006 18 (8) 214 (92) 232 
2007 15 (7) 203 (93) 218 
2008 30 (14) 185 (86) 215 
2009 16 (9) 163 (91) 179 
2010 9 (6) 145 (94) 154 
2011 5 (3) 160 (97) 165 
N 192 (7) 2,550 (93) 2,742 
a FGCO firms are defined as those that received going-concern modified audit opinions for the current fiscal year’s financial statements 
but unqualified audit opinions for the previous fiscal year’s financial statements. 
b CLEAN opinion firms are defined as those that received unqualified audit opinions for the financial statements of both current and 
previous fiscal years. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 2 reports the test result for the mean difference of all the variables used in the empirical model 
between FGCO (FGCO=1) and CLEAN-opinion firms (FGCO=0). As shown in Table 2, the mean (0.23) of 
Managerial OC for FGCO firms is greater than that (0.19) for CLEAN opinion firms, but the mean difference is not 
significant (t-statistic=1.23). Concerning financial condition, as expected, FGCO firms have smaller firm size, 
higher debt-to-equity ratio, less operating cash flows, a higher probability of bankruptcy, and less profitability than 
do CLEAN-opinion firms, and all the mean differences are significant at the 1% level. Also as predicted, FGCO 
firms have lower stock return, lower systematic market risk, and higher stock return volatility than do CLEAN-
opinion firms, and all mean differences are also significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that firms with 
poor financial condition, poor market performance, or higher market risk are more likely to receive GCOs on their 
current financial statements. Additionally, regarding mitigating factors deterring the issuance of GCOs, the mean 
(0.28 and 0.81, respectively) of Investments and Future Financing of FGCO firms are less than those (0.44 or 0.90, 
respectively) of CLEAN-opinion firms, and the mean differences are significant at the 1% level. These results 
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suggest that firms with more quickly disposable assets such as investments or future financing plans such as the 
issuance of debt or equity are less likely to receive GCOs. Contrary to our expectation, Table 2 reports that the Big 
Four auditors are less likely to issue GCOs. Also, FGCO firms have significantly less audit fees than do CLEAN-
opinion firms, implying a possible impairment of auditor’s independence in making GCO decision. The mean of the 
other control variables of Discon OP and Log(Age) is greater for FGCO firms but is insignificant. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Variables relating to the Issuance of  
First-Time Going-Concern Audit Opinion (FGCOs vs. Unqualified Audit Opinions) 
Variable Mean  t-statistic FGCO =1 FGCO =0 
Managerial OC  0.23 0.19 1.23 
Size 3.33 4.38 -9.58*** 
LEV 0.68 0.44 5.26*** 
OCF -0.59 -0.22 -7.29*** 
Prob(Bankz) 0.60 0.25 12.99*** 
Lag Loss 0.90 0.83 2.90*** 
Investments 0.28 0.44 -6.89*** 
Discon OP 0.14 0.13 0.19 
Future Financing 0.81 0.90 -2.07*** 
Big4 0.60 0.70 -2.69*** 
Log(Age) 2.25 2.20 1.06 
Return -0.18 0.08 -3.67*** 
Beta 1.01 1.41 -6.37*** 
Volatility 0.07 0.05 9.34*** 
Log(Audit Fees) 5.37 5.64 -3.32*** 
Number of observations              192            2,550  
 
Where: 
 
FGCO = coded 1 if a firm received a going-concern audit opinion on the current fiscal year’s financial statements but 
an unqualified audit opinion on the previous fiscal year’s financial statements. 
Managerial OC  = coded 1 if the sum of following five dummy variables is equal to or greater than three: 1) Excess investment 
is equal to 1 if excess investment is in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, where excess 
investment is measured as the residual from a regression of total asset growth on sales growth, and 0 
otherwise. 2) Net Acquisition is equal to 1 if net acquisitions from the statement of cash flows are in the top 
quartile of firms within the industry for the year, and 0 otherwise. 3) Debt-to-Equity ratio is dummy variable 
equal to 1 if debt-to-equity ratio is in the top quartile of firms within the industry for the year, and 0 
otherwise. 4) Risk Debt is equal to 1 if either convertible debt or preferred stock is greater than zero, and 0 
otherwise. 5) Dividend Yield is equal to 1 if dividend yield is zero, and 0 otherwise. 
Size = natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year. 
LEV = debt-to-equity ratio, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets at the end of fiscal year. 
OCF = operating cash flows, measured as cash flows from operating activities deflated by total assets at the end of 
fiscal year. 
Prob(Bankz) = probability of bankruptcy score (Zmijewski, 1984), measured as -4.803-3.599*(net income/total 
assets)+5.406*(total liabilities/total assets)-0.100*(current assets/current liabilities) 
Lag Loss = coded 1 if the firm reports net loss for the previous fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
Investments = cash and cash equivalents and short- or long-term investments deflated by total assets. 
Discon OP = coded 1 if the firms report discontinued operation, and 0 otherwise 
Future Financing = coded 1 if the firm issues equity or borrows in the subsequent fiscal year, and 0 otherwise 
Big4 = coded 1 if the firm’s auditor is one of PWC, EY, Deloitte, KPMG, and 0 otherwise. 
Log(Age) = natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was listed on a stock exchange. 
Return = the firm’s buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year 
Beta = the firm’s systematic risk estimated using a market model over the fiscal year 
Volatility = the standard deviation of the residual from the market model over the fiscal year. 
Log(Audit Fees) = natural logarithm of audit fees over the fiscal year (in thousands) 
***/**/* Significant at or below the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level (two-tailed). 
 
Table 3 shows the correlations between the main variables used for the empirical analyses. As Table 3 
shows, the correlation (0.02) between FGCO and Managerial OC is positive but low and insignificant. FGCO is 
significantly and positively correlated with Prob(Bankz) and Volatility and negatively correlated with Size, 
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Investments, Future Financing, Big4, Return, and Log(Audit_Fees) at the 1% level. All correlations except for that 
(0.67) between Size and Log(Audit_Fees) are below 0.5. Overall, the correlation results suggest that there is no 
significant multicollinearity problem in our research setting.7 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix for the Variables used in the First-Time Going-Concern Audit Opinion Model 
Variable Managerial OC Size 
Prob 
(Bankz) Investments 
Future 
Financing Big4 Return Volatility 
Log 
(Audit Fees) 
FGCO 0.02 
(0.22) 
-0.18 
(<0.01) 
0.08 
(<0.01) 
-0.13 
(<0.01) 
-0.07 
(<0.01) 
-0.05 
(<0.01) 
-0.08 
(<0.01) 
0.21 
(<0.01) 
0.06 
(<0.01) 
Managerial 
OC 
 0.29 
(<0.01) 
0.18 
(<0.01) 
-0.08 
(<0.01) 
0.04 
(<0.06) 
0.06 
(<0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(<0.01) 
Size   -0.07 
(<0.01) 
-0.09 
(<0.01) 
0.12 
(<0.01) 
0.41 
(<0.01) 
-0.10 
(<0.01) 
-.035 
(<0.01) 
0.67 
(<0.01) 
Prob(Bankz)    -.014 
(<0.01) 
0.00 
(0.92) 
-0.01 
(0.62) 
-0.11 
(<0.01) 
0.28 
(<0.01) 
0.08 
(<0.01) 
Investments     0.11 
(<0.01) 
0.23 
(<0.01) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.08 
(<0.01) 
-0.11 
(<0.01) 
Future 
Financing 
     0.11 
(<0.01) 
0.11 
(<0.01) 
-0.08 
(<0.01) 
0.06 
(<0.01) 
Big4       -0.01 
(0.46) 
-0.09 
(<0.01) 
0.32 
(<0.01) 
Return        0.18 
(<0.01) 
-0.07 
(<0.01) 
Volatility         -0.30 
(<0.01) 
Note: The table reports Pearson Correlations. P-values appear in parentheses. 
See Table 2 for the definition of variables. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
First-Time Going-Concern Audit Opinion Decision and Managerial Overconfidence 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the logistic regression on the relationship between FGCO and managerial 
overconfidence after controlling for the factors affecting auditors’ GCO decisions. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable of FGCO, which is coded 1 if a firm receives a GCO on current financial statements but a clean 
opinion on the previous financial statements. Table 4, Column 3 shows the logistic regression results for the impact 
of managerial overconfidence on FGCO issuance, where Managerial OC is measured at the firm level, using the 
five variables of firm characteristics used in Schrand and Zechman (2011). According to the results in Table 4, 
Column 3, Managerial OC, the test variable, is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that financially 
distressed firms with overconfident management are more likely to receive a FGCO. In other words, auditors 
consider overconfident management a going-concern factor in making GCO decisions. Consistent with the results in 
the univariate analysis in Table 2, FGCO is significantly and negatively correlated with Size and OCF at the 1% 
level, suggesting that firms that are smaller or have less operating cash flows are more likely to receive GCOs. 
Moreover, FGCO is significantly and positively associated with Prob(Bankz) at the 1% level, indicating that firms 
with a higher possibility of bankruptcy are more likely to receive GCOs. Investments and Discon OP as mitigating 
factors for GCOs are significantly and negatively associated with FGCO at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively, and 
Future Financing has the expected sign but is not significant. These results indicate that firms with disposable 
resources to use in avoiding financial distress are less likely to receive GCOs. All market variables have the 
expected signs and are significant at the 1% level. Contrary to the univariate results in Table 2, we find that firms 
with great leverage (Big4 or high Log(Audit_Fees)) are less (more) likely to receive FGCOs.8     
 
We thus find in the logistic regression results that managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with 
the issuance of FGCOs, suggesting that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to receive FGCOs after 
                                                
7 We test for multicollinearity among the independent variables and find that the highest individual VIF is 3.03, which is below 10, the 
conventional level. 
8 See footnote 7 for details on the potential multicollinearity problem. 
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controlling for the factors affecting auditors’ GCO decisions. Overall, it is implied that for auditors, managerial 
overconfidence is a risk factor for financially distressed firms.   
 
Table 4. Logistic regression results on the relation between FGCO  
and managerial overconfidence(FGCOs vs. Unqualified Audit Opinions) 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficients t-statistics 
Intercept ? -4.52*** -6.11 
Managerial OC  ? 0.50** 2.27 
Size - -0.43*** -3.99 
LEV + -0.54 -2.65 
OCF - -1.32*** -4.79 
Prob(Bankz) + 1.90*** 5.69 
Lag Loss + 0.21 0.76 
Investments - -3.02*** -7.40 
Discon OP - -0.47** -1.82 
Future Financing - -0.22 -0.90 
Big4 + 0.64*** 3.01 
Log(Age) - 0.44 2.63 
Return - -0.49*** -4.52 
Beta - -0.37*** -3.54 
Volatility + 17.47*** 5.71 
Log(Audit Fees) - 0.30 2.50 
Max R-Square  34.29%  
Likelihood ratio  402.24***  
Number of observations  2,742  
***/**/* Significant at or below the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level (two-tailed). 
 
First-Time Going-Concern Audit Opinion Decisions and Managerial Overconfidence Under Capital Markets 
Uncertainty 
 
During a recession, many firms experience financial difficulties, and many go bankrupt. Thus, auditors may 
be more cautious about the going-concern issue during recessions, especially for small and financially distressed 
firms. Managerial overconfidence may also be a more critical going-concern factor affecting auditors’ audit opinion 
decisions. Thus, we test the impact of capital market uncertainty such as high-profile accounting scandals and the 
global financial crisis on the association between auditors’ FGCO decisions and managerial overconfidence.  
 
For the test, we divide the sample period of 2001 to 2011 into four eras according to the U.S. capital market 
or the global economy: the 1) U.S. capital markets crisis era (2001–2002), 2) post-SOX era (2003–2006), 3) global 
financial crisis era (2007–2009), and 4) post-crisis era (2010–2011).  
 
Since 2000, U.S. capital markets have undergone high-profile accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, 
WorldCom) and the subsequent demise of Arthur Anderson. In response, the U.S. Congress passed SOX on July 30, 
2002, to restore investor confidence and enhance corporate governance and financial reporting quality. Despite the 
enactment of SOX, however, investors believe that it will take time for it to restore the damaged capital markets. 
Thus, we define 2001 to 2002 as the “U.S. capital markets crisis era” and the 2003 to 2006 period (from the SOX 
enactment to the global financial crisis) as the “post-SOX era.” Next, following Badertscher et al. (2012), the 2007 
to 2009 period is defined as the “global financial crisis era.” Since 2007, a symptom of economic recession began 
appearing, and the recession spread worldwide at great speed. The recession culminated in 2008 and continued 
through 2009. Afterwards, the world economy began to slowly recover. Thus, the 2010 to 2011 period is the “post-
crisis era.” Based on the previous discussion, in the U.S. capital markets crisis (2001–2002) and global financial 
crisis (2007–2009) periods and the post-SOX (2003–2006) and post-crisis (2010–2011) periods, U.S. capital 
markets have high and low uncertainty, respectively. 
 
For each of the four subsamples above, we re-conduct the regression analysis in Table 4. The results are 
shown in Table 5. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 present the regression results during the U.S. capital market crisis 
(2001–2002). The coefficient of Managerial OC is positive and significant at the 5% level. Columns 7 and 8 in 
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Table 5 present the regression results for the global financial crisis period (2007–2009). As shown in Columns 7 and 
8 in Table 7, the coefficient of Managerial OC is positive and significant at the 5% level. Meanwhile, as shown in 
Columns 5, 6, 9, and 10 in Table 5, during the post-SOX (2003–2006) and post-crisis (2010–2011) periods, the 
coefficients of Managerial OC are insignificant. Collectively, the results above suggest that, during the periods of 
capital market uncertainty, auditors are more likely to regard overconfident management as a going-concern factor 
and issue FGCOs to financially distressed firms.     
 
Table 5. Logistic regression results on the relation between FGCO and Managerial  
overconfidence under capital market uncertainty (FGCOs vs. Unqualified Audit Opinions) 
 U.S. Capital 
 markets crisis era Post-SOX era Global crisis era Post-crisis era 
2001-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2010-2011 
High uncertainty Low uncertainty High uncertainty Low uncertainty 
Variable Exp. 
Sign Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept ? -3.67** -2.35 -4.77*** -3.19 -2.86* -1.94 3.04 0.52 
Managerial OC ? 0.79** 1.98 -0.10 -0.23 0.89** 2.25 -1.11 -0.59 
Size - -0.12 -0.57 -0.53*** -2.64 -0.31* -1.60 -2.10*** -2.85 
LEV + -1.00 -1.62 -0.28 -0.97 -0.61 -1.26 -2.90 -1.38 
OCF - -2.49*** -4.05 -0.67* -1.38 -0.93** -2.11 -0.62 -0.39 
Prob(Bankz) + 1.81** 2.30 2.45*** 4.20 1.69*** 2.49 3.85* 1.63 
Lag Loss + 0.42 0.76 -0.45 -0.93 0.71* 1.36 0.09 0.07 
Investments - -3.85*** -4.28 -3.19*** -3.99 -2.44*** -3.67 -4.43** -2.08 
Discon OP - -0.51 -0.92 -0.63* -1.30 -0.16 -0.35 0.44 0.39 
Future Financing - -0.15 -0.31 -0.29 -0.60 -0.44 -1.09 0.57 0.45 
Big4 + -0.22 -0.48 0.41 1.05 1.05** 2.38 4.79*** 3.31 
Log(Age) - 0.52 1.53 0.52 1.43 0.26 0.93 0.08 0.11 
Return - -0.26 -1.24 -0.90*** -3.64 -0.39** -2.02 -0.84 -1.23 
Beta - -0.57*** -3.07 -0.34** -1.82 0.14 0.52 0.53 0.63 
Volatility + 14.49** 1.87 20.68*** 2.79 16.40*** 3.57 4.69 0.26 
Log(Audit Fees) - 0.06 0.22 0.45 2.04 -0.10 -0.40 -0.30 -0.31 
Max R-Square  41.06%  39.81%  29.29%  55.13%  
Likelihood ratio  145.55  154.80  92.14  58.19  
Number of 
observations  760  1,051  612  319  
***/**/* Significant at or below the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level (two-tailed). 
See Table 2 for the definition of variables. 
 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
FGCO Firms vs. Firms with Standard Unqualified Audit Opinion Reports 
 
In the previous main regression analysis, the final sample is composed of two subsamples: 1) FGCO firms 
and 2) CLEAN opinion firms. we confined the CLEAN opinion firms to the firms with unqualified audit opinions. 
In this section, as a sensitivity analysis, we narrow down the CLEAN opinion firms into those with standard 
unqualified audit opinion reports. As a result, the sample decreases from 2,742 to 1,540 firm-year observations, 
consisting of 140 FGCO firms and 1,400 CLEAN opinion firms. First, we conduct a mean difference test between 
140 FGCO firms and 1,400 CLEAN opinion firms. According to the (untabulated) results, compared to the results in 
Table 2, the t-statistics (1.88) of Managerial OC are positive and significant at the conventional level, suggesting 
that GCO firms are more likely to have overconfident management. The results of the mean difference test of the 
other variables are similar to those in Table 2.  
 
Next, we re-run the regression model in Table 4 on the relationship between FGCO and management 
overconfidence. In the (untabulated) results, we find, consistent with those in Table 4, that Managerial OC is 
negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that overconfident management is a going-concern factor rather 
than a mitigating factor. This result reinforces the findings shown in Table 4 that, among financially distressed 
firms, those with overconfident management are more likely to receive FGCOs.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2015 Volume 31, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 2135 The Clute Institute 
Finally, using the subsample of 1,540 firm-year observations above, we re-conduct the regression analyses 
in Table 5 on the impact of capital markets uncertainty (e.g., high-profile accounting scandals, global financial 
crisis) on the relationship between auditors’ FGCO decisions and managerial overconfidence. The (untabulated) 
results show, consistent with the findings in Table 5, that, during the U.S. capital markets crisis era, Managerial OC 
is positive and significant at the conventional level. During the global financial crisis, the coefficient of Managerial 
OC is positive but insignificant. Finally, as in the findings in Table 5, there is no significant association between 
FGCO and Management OC during the post-SOX (2003–2006) or post-crisis (2010–2011) period. These results 
partially support the previous findings in Table 5 that capital market uncertainty reinforces the association between 
auditors’ GCO decisions and management overconfidence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Recently, academics have hotly debated the impact of managerial overconfidence on a variety of corporate 
decisions such as corporate investment, mergers and acquisitions, financing, dividend policies, earnings 
management, management forecasting, tax avoidance, financial misreporting, and accounting conservatism. 
However, few have studied how parties outside firms perceive managerial overconfidence. This study examines how 
auditors incorporate their perceptions of managerial overconfidence into their audit reporting decisions. We test the 
association between managerial overconfidence and the likelihood of issuing first-time going-concern audit 
opinions. We find that auditors are more likely to issue first-time going-concern audit opinions to financially 
distressed firms with overconfident CEOs, suggesting that auditors consider overconfident CEOs a going-concern 
factor rather than a mitigating factor. Further analyses reveal that the positive association between the likelihood of 
first-time going-concern audit opinion and managerial overconfidence is reinforced with capital market uncertainty 
(e.g., the global financial crisis period of 2007 to 2009). 
 
In sum, consistent with the prior findings that CEO overconfidence negatively affects firm value, we 
provide evidence that auditors negatively value overconfident CEOs when making going-concern audit opinion 
decisions.  
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